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ASYLUM DENIED:
THE VIGILANT INCIDENT
Clyde R. Mann
There arc three classes of people
in the world. The first learn from
their own ('xperi('nee-thes(' are
wise; the second learn from the
experience of others-these arc
the happy; the third neither learn
from their own experience nor the
experience of others-these arc
fools.
The Earl of Chesterfield 1
Introduction. The attempt by Simas
lonovieh Kudirka, a Lithuanian crewman on the Sovietskaya Litva, to seck
asylum in the United States via the U.S.
Coast Guard culler Vigilant on 23
November 1970 und his forcible return
to the Soviet fishing ship huve been
widely reported and discussed by the
citillenry. The case has created such
interest and controversy as to cause thc

author to study the maller in detail. It
is not the pnrpoSl.: of this artie!!', with
tlw h('nefit IlI'rlllill(·d. hy till: dlll'ity of
hindsight, to present a learned analysis
of the legal principles involved nor to
fix blame nor to critieillc the Coast
Guard, the Department of State, or any
member thereof. Rather, the purpose of
this article is to attempt to exclude all
who read it from the last class of people
listed by Chesterfield and to place them
squarely in the wise and happy classes
of people who learn from their own
experiences and the experiences of
others. Hopefully, the readers will
analyze the reported facts and events
and make their own judgments concerninl! fault and blame, if any, after
carefully considering the many significant aspects of the case. Command and
control, the deeisionmaking process,

The opinions shared in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions
of the U.S. Naval War College, the Dept. of the Navy, or Dept. of Defense.

599
international law and politics, principles
of military leadership, and concern for
humanity are but a few of the:;c aspects.
Although no formal conelu:;ions as to
fault or blame are ,Irawn by the author,
some recommendations are proposed to
serve as guidelines for a U.S. commander who is confronted by a similar
situation in the fu ture.
The facts and events as reported
herein are bascd upon a memorandum
prcpared for the President of the United
States,2 reports of official investigations
by the U.S. Coast Guard 3 and the
Department of State,4 congressional
hearings before a subcommittce of the
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
House of Representatives and the
subcommittee's report thereon,s and
the author's personal interview of some
of the participants and eyewitnesses. 6
Much of the material contained in the
official investigation by the U.S. Coast
Guard has been incorporated in this
artiele in hoc verba in summarizing the
events which occurred in the Vigilant, at
the First Coast Guard District Headquarters in Boston, and at Coast Guard
Headquarters in Washington. The material so used remains unrebutted after
independent investigation by the author. A chronology of events is
con taincd in appcndix I.
The Rendezvous, Conference, Overtures of Defection, and Search for
Advice. An offshore meeting between
representatives of the New Bedford,
Mass. fishermen, the National Marine
Fisheries Service of the Department of
Commerce, and the Soviet fishing fleet
operating off the New England coast
was arranged through appropriate diplomatic and other official channels. The
purpose of the meeting was to discuss
the allegation of the New Bedford
fishermcn that thc Soviet fishermcn
were taking too lIlany yellowtail nounder and that thcreshould be some
rcstriction of fishing for such spccies.
The Soviet fishermen had denied any

overfishing•. Similar meetings with Soviet fishing fleets had been hdd in
rccent years off both lhe A tlantic and
Pacific coasts. Tlw U.S. Coast Guard
culler Vigilant (WMI~C-6J7) was dilly
designatcd by thl: Commander, Fin;t
Coast Guard District, Boston, Mass., to
provide transportation for the U.S.
delcgatiqn. The Vigilant is a medium
endurance cutter, 2 LO feet in length,
with a complement of 10 officers and
61 crewmen.
The U.S. delegation consisted of
both civilian and Government officials.
The fishermen were represented by Mr.
Robert M. Brieze, president of the New
Bedford Seafood Producers' Association; Mr. John Burt, the port agent for
the New Bedford Fishermen's Union;
and Mr. R.W. Nickerson, the resident
director for the Seafood Association of
New Bedford. The Assistant Regional
Director, National Marine Fisheries
Service, Department of Commerce, Mr.
William C. Gordon, represented the
United States. The delegation was
accompanied by an interpreter, Mr.
Alexis Obolensky from the National
Marine Fisheries Service, Department of
Commerce. In addition, Lt. Leo Morehouse from the Law Enforcement
Division, Office of Operations, U.S.
Coast Guard IIcmlqlHlrters ill Wushington, attended as an observer.
The U.S. delcgation boarded the
Vigilant at B a.m. on Monday, 2:~
November 1970. The ship got underway
at 8:49 a.m. and at 10:30 a.m. came
alongside and moored port side to the
Soviet vessel Sovietskaya Litva which
had anchored within the 3-mile limit,
that is, within the territorial waters of
the United States. The point of
rendezvous was about 1 mile off
\'vlartha's Vineyard, Mass. The Sovietskaya Litva is a factory ship, a lIlother
ship, ilpproximately 500 feet in lenl-"(th,
di~placing about 14,000 ton~, with a
crcw of about 150 men and 35 women.
The Soviets prepared a guard boom
rigged from the Sovietskaya Litva,
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constructed of wircs and secured to a
net with an old truck tire at the bottom.
This wire, net, and tire devicc, suspended from the boom by a cable, was
used to transfer personnel between the
two ships.
The U.S. dclegation, together with
Comdr. Ralph W. Eustis, thc Commanding Officer of the Vigilant,
boarded the Soviet vessel for the
confcrcnce. They had a brief luncheon
in the Soviet Fishing Fleet Commander's cabin before proceeding to a
conference room to begin talks. Aftcr
holding discussions for an hour or more;
the group from the Vigilant was given a
tour of the Soviet ship and returned to
the conference room for more food,
cognac, and talk. The Soviet conferees
included the commanders of Lithuanian, Zapryba, Kalivingrad, and Latvian fishing fleets operating in the
Atlantic Ocean off New England; the
Chief Inspector for Safety of Navigation; the Chief Technologist; the Chief
Master Catcher of the Zapryba Fleet;
the Captain and till' First Mate of the
Sovietskaya Litva. SOllle of the Soviets
appeared to be politieal and military
officials rather than usual crewmcmbers.
No armament was visible on the Soviet
ship. J\,lr. Bricze, the president of Ihe
New Bedford Seafood Produccrs A.,..
sociation (a 1944 refugee from Latvia)
speaks Latvian and was able to engage
four Latvians on the Soviet ship in
conversation. It appeared to the U.S.
delegation that the talks were procecding in a relatively successful manner.
While the conferecs were taking care
of the business at hand, some of the
Vigilant and Sovietskaya Litva personnel were standing near the rails of
the two ships laughing, talking, and
exchanging cigarettcs and candy. Some
Vigilant crewmembers jokingly suggested to their opposites that th"y
shoulll I'onw ahoard the 1"igilallt. The
Soviet f:'hip personnel responded hy
drawing thcir fingers across their necks.

It if:' not clear whether these gestures
were in jest or otherwisl'. Sonll!
personnel from the Vigilant, officer and
enlisted, visited the Soviet ship. Such
personnel were permitted to view the
ship's engineroom, medical facilities,
mess deck, and movie theater. During
one such visit, Ens. John F. Hughes
from the Vigilant met a second mate
from the Soviet ship who could
understand some words of the English
language.
Meanwhile, the first of several
overtures by a single crewman from tllll
Soviet ship indicating a desire to defect
or to seek asylum was observed. At
approximately 11:00 a.m., Lt. (jg.)
Douglas A. Lundberg, the Operations
Officer of the Vigilant, was on the port
wing of the bridge when he noticed a
crewman from the Soviet ship observing
him closely from an upper deck about B
feet across from him on the Soviet ship.
This man was dressed in dark pants,
sport shirt, and coat and was about 5
fect 6 inches tall, weighed about 140
pounds, and appmlrl,d to he VI'ry
Illu:;(:ular. The lIlan was later idl'nlifil:d
as Simas lonovidl Kudirka.
Kudirka maclc a commcnt whidl
Lundbcrg thought suggested an intl'ntion to ddeet to the tlnitell Siall's.
Kudirka aded as if he did not dl!sire 10
be detected by any of his shipmates. He
looked over each of his shoulders and
said, "gestapo, gestapo"!7 Lieutenant
Lundberg immediately notified the
Executive Officer of the Vigilant, Lt.
Comdr. Paul E. Pakos, of his Imcounter
with Kudirka. Thc Commanding Officer
of the Vigilant, Commander Eustis, was
on board the Sovietskaya Litva at this
time. Pakos assigned Lundberg to the
forecastle and Lt. (jg.) Richard E.
Burke, Jr., the Communications Officer,
to the fantail of the Vigilant to watch
for Kudirka. Pakos went to the port
wing of the bridf.!;e lIIlIl g;IW Kudirka.
who slall'd in brokl'n Engli~h. "I will go
wilh you" anq. later, "I will cheek."
Kudirka then left, returned a I'mv
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minutes later, and stated, "Not too
eold.,,8 Pakos concluded that Kuclirka
was planning to jump into the water. By
this time other members of the
Vigiwnt's crcw had noticed Kudirka and
his apparent unusual interest in the
Vigilant. Boatswain's Mate Third Class
Richard P. Maresca saw Kudirka acting
suspiciously ncar the rail of the Soviet
ship. Ensign Hughes saw Kudirka, and
the lalter tried to communicate with
him, but his words were not understood
by Hughes.
In vil:w of Kudirka's continued
manifestations of interest in the Vigiwnt, Pakos concluded by 12 m. that
Kudirka might attempt to defect to the
United States at any moment. He
decided to tell only the Vigilant's
officers of Kudirka's possible defection.
He instructed them not to encourage
Kudirka and made sure that one of the
ship's officers was always on the bridge
in case Kudirka decided to communicate further with them. Lundberg was
positioned on the port wing of the
bridge. Pakos went below decks to draft
a message to the First Coast Guard
District in Boston. He decided to release
the message and to attempt to get
Commander Eustis back on board. The
message was transmitted from the
Vigilant at 12:43 p.m. (date time group
231743Z because the Vigilant was in
time zone plus 5, therefore, all message
communications traffic identified in
Zulu time is 5 hours in advance of
eastern standard time), the text of
which follows:
A. MY 231558Z NOV 70
1. SITUATION:
ALONGSIDE
SOVIET MOTHER SHIP AS PER
REF A. ESTIMATE 80 PERCENT PROBABILITY THAT
ONE CREWl\>IAN FROM SOVIET
MOTHER SHIP WILL ATTEMPT
DEFECTION TO VIGILANT.
DEFECTION WAS NOT ENTICED. CREWMAN SPOKE IN
BROKEN
ENGLISH
TO

OPERATIONS OFFICER THAT
II1~ WISHED ASYLUM. SAME
MAN LATER INDICATED TO
EXEC OFF THAT WATER NOT
TOO COLD AND THAT HE
WO ULD SWIM. CO AND OTHER
VISITORS STILL ABOARD
AND
UNAWARE
OF
SITUATION. WILL ATTEMPT
TO ADVISE CO.
2. IF ESCAPE IS UNDETECTED
PLAN TO RECALL ENTIRE
DELEGATION ONDER FALSE
PHETENSE AND DI~PAHT. IF
ESCAPE DETECTED FORESEE
MAJOR PROBLEMS IF DELEGATION STILL ABOARD. REQ.
ADVICE.
3. PLAN NO ACTION PENDING
FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS. 9
This message arrived at the headquarters
of the Commander, First Coast Guard
District at 12:49 p.m. Capt. Fletcher W.
Brown, Jr., usually the Chief of Staff,
was Acting District Commander. He had
been so acting since· 3 November 1970
when Rear Adm. William B. Ellis, the
regular District Commander had gone
on sick leave. When the message from
the Vigilant was received, Captain
Brown was out of the headquarters
having lunch. lIe returned to his office
at 1:07 p.m. at which time his secretary
informed him of the Vigiwnt's message.
He went to the Communications Center,
read the message, and directed that it be
sent to the Commandant of the Coast
Guard. The message was received at
Coast Guard Headquarters at 1:28 p.m.
As Captain Brown was leaving the
Communications Center, he saw Comdr.
Jerome V. Flanagan, the District Legal
Officer, showed him the message, and
asked for his advice. Flanagan stated
that should the man defect, he should
be turned over to the State Department
or Immigration Service.
Captain Brown returned to his office
at or about 1:18 p.m. and telephoned
Rear Adm. Robert E. Hammond, Chief,
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OfficI! of Operations, at Coast Guard
Headquarters in Washington. Brown
indicated that he desired help on a
problem, told Hammond ahout the
message from the Vigilant and that it
had bi!en readdressed to Coast Gu'ard
Headquarters and that the ships were
about a mile from Martha's Vineyard
within territorial waters. They diseussed
the issues raised by the Vigilant's
message as they saw them and both
concluded that the main issue was how
forcefully the personnel of the Vigilant
eould eompete with the personnel of
the Sovietskaya Litva in retrieving the
defeetor in the event he jumped into the
water. They did not diseuss possihle
courses of action to be taken in the
event the person seeking asylum or
defection actually came into Coast
Guard hands by jumping from the
Soviet ship to the Vigilant or otherwise.
Hammond indicated he would seck
guidance from the Department of State.
At the eompletion of this telephone
conversation, Hammond summoned
Capt. Wallace C. Dahlgren, Chief,
Intelligence Divisioll at Coast Guard
Headquarters, and briefed him Oil the
conversation with Brown and the
Vigilant's message. Dahlgren was direeted to contact the State DepartuH!lIt
for guidanee on the problem of gelling
the defector out of the water. He was
not asked to inquire as to U.S. policy
with respect to defectors or persons
seeking asylum. When the Vigilant
message arrived at 1:28 p.m. Hammond
took a copy thereof to thc office of the
Commandant of the Coast Guard and
discussed thc mcssage and action being
takcn with respect thereto with Viee
Adm. Thomas It. Sargent 1fI, Assistant
Commandant of the Coast Guard. He
then returned to his office. He did not
eon tact thc office of the Chief Counsel
for advice.
Captuin Dahlp:ren returned to his
offiee, ufter having rl'eeived instructions
from ({('ar Admiral Hammond, ut ahout
J:30 p.m. and placed u telephone call to

the Coast Guard Liaison Officer at the
State DepartmenL Shortly thereafter
the Vigilant's message was sent to the
State Department. After some delay and
several rereferrals, Dahlgren was, at 2:45
p.m., able to telephonically communicate with Mr. Edward K. Killham,
Officer in Charge, Bilateral Political
Affairs, Office of Soviet Union A ffuirs,
Department of 8tute, who considered
himself to be the proper person to give
advice on the maUer. Dahlgmn informed Killham that it applmreo a
seaman from a Soviet ship would
attempt to defect to a Coast Guard
eutler, that the Vigilant's message had
been sent to the State Department, and
requested guidance. Mr. Killham st,ltecl
that he would wait until he studied the
message before he could comment on
the situation. The message was received
by him at 3 p.m. and at 3: 15 p.m. he
telcphoned Dahlgren. Both of these
gentlemen recall that thc main topic of
the conversation was the amount of
force which could properly be used by
Coast Guard per!'onnd in ('omp(·tin~
with perRonncl of tIll: Sovil:t ship in
attempting to retrieve a man from tllll
Soviet ship from the sea. Mr. Killham
advised that the Coast Guard could
exer('i~(: its traditional responHihilily of
search and resclle if the man waH in the
water. 10 It docs not appear that
Killham had been informed or was
otherwise aware of the fact that the
Vigilant and the Sovietskaya Litva were
within the territorial waters of the
United States. Neither Killham nor
Dahlgrcn discussed the possible ways,
other than being retrieved from the
water, in which the def('dor ('ould
arrive aboard the Coast Guard ship.
Killham saw three issues raised by the
facts known to him: The possibility that
the dcfeetion was not ~t:nuiaw mid that
it was a Soviet provocation ,111I'lIIpl; tlw
problem of the proper amount of fon:l'
the Coast {~uurd could IIS(~ 10 rl~triev(!
the mun from the water; and, the
problem of what to do if the defector
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~ot

in tile Vigilant whill' t\ nwrieans
remained on board the Soviet ship. lie
advised Dahlgren that the Coast Guard
should do nothing to entice the
defector, that until the defector was on
board the Vigilant till! State Department
could offer no further advil!e, but that
once till! man was on board, the State
Department should be notified.
Mr. Killham later indicated that he
believes his advice to Captain Dahlgren
did adequately eover the possibility of
what could be done if the man
alleml'ted to ddeeL by jumping from
the Soviet ship into the water but that
further information was needed before
the State Department could render
ndviee rl'lalivI~ to the problem of whnt
to do if the defector got in the Vigilant
while all or a portion of the U.S.
del(~gation or Vigilant personnel were
still 011 board the Soviet ship. It wns for
this reason that he advised Dahlgren
that the State Department could give no
further advice until the defector was on
board and the State Departm('nt so
notified. I\lr. Killham later indicated
that he did not specifically advisl~
Dahlgrc~n that till' Coast <;uard should
retain the IIc.fI~ctor until advice was
receivI:d from the State Department hilt
thal h(' could not imaginl' anyonl'
returning a Ih~rl:ctor without first
obtaining such advice. 1 t
As soon as Captain Brown had
compldl·d his tl'l':l'hqnie convl:rsation
with I{('ar Admir:t1 Hmnmond, he plaeed
a call to Rear Admiral Ellis, the regular
Commander, ~'irst Coast Guard District,
who was horne on convalescent leave.
The time was I :~o p.m. when Brown
briefed Ellis relative to the Vigilant
message and his conversation with
Hammond. Ellis indicated concern re~arding till! pO!;sihility of ,\ defec:lion
bl'emls!' till' Sovil'l vI's,;el had l'ntl'l"l'll
lI.S. lI'rritorial wali'rs by I'rop!'r invitation mill a Ih·fl·l~ti()1I eould disrupt till'
talks of consid!'rable interest to the
fishing iIHlustry. HI' was also eoncerned
when he was informed that U.S.

personnel WI~rI! still on the Sovid ship.
It was for these reasons that he told
Brown, "If we gel the defector, we
should give him back."1 2 After this
eonversation was completed, Brow'n
turned lo an officer on the staff and
stated, "We arc going to relurn the
man.,,13 The time was l:30 p.m. Brown
then went to thc Communications
Centcr where he drafted and sent his
instructions in reply to the Vigilant's
message. The text of such message
follows:
A. YOUR 231743Z NOV 70
l. TAKE NO DIRECT OR
OVERT-ACTION. HOWEVER BE
l' IU:P ARE!)
TO
LAUNCII
SMALL BOAT LM"'IEDIATEL Y.
2. GET CDR EUSTIS BACK
ABOARD USING ANY PRI<:TEXT.
3. COMDT
NOTIFIED
OF
SITUATION.
4. IF MAN GOES IN WAT 1m
<:lVE USSR EVERY OPPORTUNITYTO RECOVER.14
Thig IIII$sagc: was not reeeived by till:
Vigilant until 3::~6 p.m., aboul 2 hours
afll:r it w,is released with an opr:rations
im llll:dia le I'rI~eedl·lH:e.
i\leanwhile, haek in the Vigilal1t,
Lieulenant COlllmander Pakos had already laken sleps to notify COlllmandl:r
Eustis of till! (l()!;.';ihle defl:dion. At
12:45 p.m. he had sl:nt a messengel· lo
the Soviet vessel with two old search
and rescue messages to deliver to Eustis
as a strnta~cm to get him back aboard
the Vigilant. Eustis returned to the
Vigilant at 12:52 p.m. and was met hy
Pakos who said nothing about the
possihle defection until they had
reached Eustis' captain's cahin. TIII're
P<lkos told Eustis <III till' known fads
("olll'l'rning till' poSoo;ihlt· IIt.fI·dion arlll
showl'd him the II\I'ssage III: had earlil'r
sent to the Fir,;l Coast Guard District.
Eustis concluded llwl l:vell withoul
encouragement from anyone in the
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Vigilant an attempt to defect was
inevitable and that such attempt would
most likely occur while the ships were
unmooring at the conclusion of the
talks. He decided that the best course of
action was to continue the talks as if no
indication of a possible defection had
been noted. As a precaution, he
instructed Pakos to ensure there was no
encouragement givcn to the possible
defector by any member of the
Vigilant's crew. Eustis returned to the
Sovietskaya Litva at about 1:45 p.m.,
and, while looking for the conference
room, he met and was engaged in
conversation by the Soviet First Mate,
Smilir S. Grumaurker.
As all of the foregoing activity was
taking place, Kudirka continued to
attempt to communicate with Lieutenant Lundberg, by raising his eyebrows in an inquisitive manner, as if to
query the propriety of the defection.
Lundberg, in accordance with instructions received from Pakos, made no
response and gave no signal to K udirka.
At about 2 p.m. Kudirka threw a
package of Soviet cigarettes to Lundberg who was still standing on the port
wing of the Vigilant's bridge. Lundberg
felt a bulge in the cigarette pack, said
"thank you," and smoked one of the
cigarettes on the bridge in an effort not
to arouse any Soviet suspicion. He then
went into the pilot house, tore open the
cigarette package, and found a handwritten note about 2 inches square with
handwritten matter on both sides. One
side read:
My dear Comrade I will up down
of russians ship and go with you
together. If it is a possible please
give me signal. I keep a sharp
100kout=Simas
The other side read:
I up down in the time when the
conference is End, and your
delegats l sic] go into your ships a
Board! 1 5

Lundberg passed this note to Pakos
who immediately sent a messenger to
the Soviet ship to recal! Eustis to the
Vigilant in the same manner as before.
The messenger found Eustis still talking
to the Soviet First Mate. The conversation was terminated, and Eustis returned to his ship where he was shown
Kudirka's note. He prepared and released, at 2:23 p.m., a message (date
time group 231923Z) to the First Coast
Guard District, the text of which
follows:
A. MY 231743Z NOV 70
1. VIG CO AWARE OF SITUATION.
2. NOTE FROM SOVIET CREW
MEMBER OF SOVEFTAUA
rSIC] LITVA INDICATES ESCAPE ATTEMPT PLANNED
WHEN VIGILANT IS READY
TO DEPART.
3. REQUEST GAY HEAD CG
HA VE
SUITABLE
BOAT
STANDING
BY
OUTSIDE
JETTY
COMMENCING
231530Q. BOAT SHOULD BE
INSTRUCTED TO REMAIN FAR
AWAY
FROM
VIGILANT
UNTIL VIGILANT HAD DEPARTlm SOVIET VESSEL. AT
THAT TIME BOAT SHOULD
PROCEED TO VIGILANT FOR
INSTRUCTIONS AND BE PREPARED TO PICKUP MAN IN
WATER} 6
Due to communications difficulLies or
failures, the above message, with an
operations immediate precedence, was
not received by the First Coast Guard
District until 6:38 p.m. the same day.
After he released the foregoing message,
Eustis went to the bridge of the Vigilant
where hc observed Kudirka who spoke
Lo him illllieating LhaL III: mighL Iry Lo
swim to the Vigilant. Eustis showed no
indication of undersLanding or encouragement to Kudirka. Eustis departed the bridge and returned to the
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Soviet vessel at 2:45 p.m. He entered
the conference room where the talks
were being held and quietly informed
Mr. Gordon, the National Marine
Fisheries Service representative, of the
possible defection. He suggested that
they try to conclude the conference as
soon as possible. By the time all
conversations and farewell toasts were
completed, the time was approaching 4
p.m. The unmooring was not immediate, however, because the Soviet Fleet
Commander had earlier expressed a
desire to visit the Vigilant. Eustis felt
obliged to invitc a group of about a
dozen Soviet officers aboard the Vigilant. They remained on board a few
minutcs and began departing shortly
after 4 p.m. in groups of three or four
inasmuch as the transfer net would not
comfortably hold more. Eustis stopped
by his cabin on the way to the bridge to
make preparations for unmooring and
getting underway.
Back in Boston, Captain Brown had
gathered Capt. William E. Murphy,
Comdr. John F. Curry, and Comdr.
Jerome V. Flanagan, the Acting Chief of
the Operations Division, the Chief,
Intclligence and Law Enforcement
Branch, and the District Legal Officer,
respectively, in his office for a conference. They discussed the prospective
defection in general terms and specifically discussed what to do if the
defeetor got into the water or if he
somehow got in the Vigilant. They
talked about cases of defection and
asylum they had read or heard about in
the past. The consensus was that a final
decision on the issue of returning the
defector to the Soviet ship should be
based upon guidance from the Commandant of the Coast Guard and/or the
State Department. Flanagan reiterated
his view that if the defector got aboard
the Vigilant, the Coast Guard should
keep him on board, take him to 13oston,
and turn him over to the State
Department or Immigration Service.
The conference terminated shortly

before 3:30 p.m. at which time Brown
telephoned Rear Admiral Ellis at his
home. He told him that he had heard
nothing further from the Vigilant (as
noted above, the Vigilant message
advising him of Kudirka's note was
released at 2:23 p.m. but was not
received at the District Headquarters
until 6:38 p.m.), and he had received no
guidance from Coast Guard Headquarters in Washington. He then informed Ellis of the consensus of the
opinion of his staff officers with whom
he had just finished conferring. Ellis
stated that his mind was not changed by
such consensus of opinion of the staff
officers because there were no known
new facts. 1 7
Captain Dahlgren telephoned Captain
Brown in Boston at 3:45 p.m., related
the advice Mr. Killham had given and
that the State Department had requested to be notified when the man
was on board the Vigilant. Shortly
thereafter, Captain Dahlgren returned tQ
Rear Admiral Hammond's office and
briefed him on what had occurred since
their last meeting.
ClIptain Brown telephoned \tear
Admiral Hammond in \V ashington at
4: 12 p.m. and stated that he had not
receivcd any further information from
thc Vigilant. The two men diseU!;sed the
nature of the advice received from the
State Department. Hammond told
Brown to call Coast Guard Headquarters
when the defector was on board the
Vigilant. There was no discussion
regarding return of the defector to the
Soviets. Brown asked whether he should
catch his regular commuter service to
his residence. Hammond told him that
there did not appear to be any reason
why he should 110t go home. Captain
Dahlgren was in Hammond's office and
was also on the telephonc with Brown
and 1I11mmond during the foregoing
conversation.
Lt. Gg.) Wayne D. Tritbough, the
duty officer in Coast Guard Headquarters Flag Plot, was briefed in Rear
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Admiral Hammond's orfice on Lhis
matLer. If tlwre wa:-; a defection he was
Lo be advised by someone from the First
District in Boston and he was Lo pass
such information Lo the SLaLe Department. Tritbough had the impression
thaL once the dpfeetor was in Lhe
Vigilant the SLate Department would
detcrmine what furLher action was to be
taken. He recalls havin/!: heard nOLhing
said concerning returning the defector
to the Sovids.
AL approximaLely 4::W p.m. Captain
Dahlgren Lelephoned I\lr. K iIIhmn aL Lhe
State DeparLmenL and told him that no
further information regarding the defection had been reeeived from the First
Coast Guard DisLricL. He advised KiIIham that the CoasL Guard Flag Plot
duty officer would keep the StaLe
DeparLment informed if anything further developed. Thereafter, Killham
briefed his at'sisLant, Mr. Edward A.
Mainland, Desk Officer, Bilateral Section, Office of Soviet Affairs, Department of State, who was the Soviet Oet'k
duty offi(:er for thaL evening. Neither
Killhmn nor I'vlainlmlll briefed the SLate
Department Operations C('nter watdl
officer regarding this maLLer.
In Roston, CapLain Brown left his
office at 4:30 p.m. wiLhout furtlwr
disclll:'sing the matter with his staff.
Brown did not assign anyone on his
staff, and no Olll\ assumed, responsibility with respect to this case. Captain
Murphy and Commander Curry did,
however, call the First District Headquarters later in the evening for
briefings on the status of the matter.
The Defection and Resulting Action.
Meanwhile, back in the Vigilant, evening
colors were held at 4:08 p.m., and it
was dark wiLhin a few minutes thereafter. AL 4: 15 p.m. only Lhree of lht'
Sovid offieert' who had been inviled
aboard remained on the Vigilant.
Lieutenant Commander Pakos was on
the port wing of the bridge. He noLiecd
Kudirka was standing opposiLe him on

lhe SovieL ship. KlIdirka looked down at
Lhe forecasLlc as if to ask whcther that
would be a good place to come aboard
the Vigilant. Pakos was, however,
looking down toward the boaL deck.
Kudirka stared at Pakos. Pakos shrugged
his shoulders. Kudirka disappean·d from
Pakos' view. A few minutes later, aL
about 4:20 p.m., Kudirka surprised
Pakos as he appeared on the bridge of
the Vigilant He had apparenLly jumped
from the Soviet ship lo a low('r d(~ek
I(~vd of the Vi[{ilullt. Kudirka (·mhrae(·d
Pakos and l:alle(1 him "I:omrade."\ H
Kudirka seemed to be very happy.
Pakos quickly removed Kudirka from
the bridge and had him taken lo Lhe
watehstander's hea(!. Pakos assigned Ll.
(jg.) Richard E. Burke, Jr., to guard the
defector but had Burke relieved by a
ercwmember a few minutes later.
Commander EusLis was sLiII in his cabin
when Pakos arrived and report(:d Lhal
the defector was aboard the Vigilant.
Commander Eustis concluded that he
would have a problem if the Soviets had
ob~('rv(~d or were ;tW;tr\: of th(· d(·f(·(!Lion. lie went to Ilw hrill/!,' and lh('r(~
oJ,SI'rv(~d Ilm'(! Sovil·t offie('rs :-;liII
slanding on the Vigilant's nighL (let:k
bu L making no effort to return to Lheir
~hip. 1~lIstis r!'LlIrlwd lo his (·ahin. I"~
was noL aware of the spedfil:s or ll.S.
policy regarding political asylum but
had heard of other defections, ;tnd he
Lhought Kudirka would be granted
asylum. He did not consider returning
Kudirka to the Soviets. LieuLenant
Morehouse, the observer from Coast
Guard Headquarters, entered Eustis'
cabin and was informed of the defection .. Eustis asked his advice to which
Morehouse replied that WashingLon
should be advised. The two officers
wenL to the bridge to eontacL the FirsL
Coast (~uard OisLriet and report the f;td
th'll the defector W;tS ou bourll Lhe
Vigilant Lieutenant Lundberg was interviewing Kudirka about this Lime. He
was the first of the Vigilant's officers Lo
do so.
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Commander Eustis called the First
District Headquarters, rcquested a telephone patch with either Captain Brown
or Commander Curry, and was informed
that neither one of them was available
as they were: en route to their homes.
He then called Rear Admiral Ellis at
5: ] 5 p.m. Eustis told Ellis that the
defector was aboard but thc Soviets had
not yet asked for his return. Ellis
replied,
] n vicw of the nature of present
arrangcmcnts with them and in
the interest of not fouling up any
of our arrangements as far as the
fishing situation is concerned, I
think they should know this and
if thcy choose to do nothing, keep
him on board, otherwise put him
back.! 9
Eustis acknowledged these instructions
and commented that if the defector
jumped overboard from the Soviet ship
after having been returned and as the
Vigilnllt departed, he would attempt to
pick him up. Rllis replied that, in that
event, tllll Soviets shonld havI! the first
opportunity to pick him up and at the
same lime he cautioned Eustis to make
sure the Vigilant did 1I0t preempt the
Soviets ill taking that at:lion. Eustis then
stated that the Vigilant would get
underway shortly and he would keep
the District advised of the situation as it
progressed. 20
At the conclusion of the telephone
patch, Rear Admiral Ellis told Lt.
Kcnneth N. Ryan, the duty officer at
the Rescue Coordination Center, District Headquarters, to contact Captain
Brown and inform him of the conversation with Cornman per Eustis. Ellis
stated he realized that he had interjected himself betwcen Brown and
Eustis.
Back in the Vigilallt the tillle was
5:20 1'.111. and Lieutenant Morehonse
had gone to Commander Eustis' cabin
and found four Soviets there, including

Fleet Comdr. Ivan A. Burkal, Commander of the Lithuanian Fleet, and the
Soviet interpreter, Genrikar K. Baltrunar. Mr. Gordon and Mr. Obolensky
were also present. The Soviets just sat
quietly without making any conversation. No one said anything about
Kudirka.
After talking to Rear Admiral Ellis,
Commander Eustis went to sec Kudirka.
He spoke with him for a period in
excess of one-half hour, during which
Lime Kudirkll stated he was married and
his home was Klaipeda, Lithuania, a
Baltic port city. Eustis was convinced
that Kudirka was sincere in his desire
not to return to the Soviet ship.
At 5:40 p.m. the Vigilant called till:
Coast Guard Group, Woods Hole, Mass.,
and requested a small craft to rendezvons with them for reasons of "utmost
political importance. ,,21 At 5:44 p.m.
the Woods Hole Group called Lieutenant Ryan, the duty officer at the
Rescue Coordination Center, District
Headquarters, to determine the reason
for the requcst. Ryan told them to have
a "44 footer" stand hy to assist till!
Vigilant.
The Soviet officers aboard the
Vigilnnt indicated to Mr. Obolensky, at
about 5:tf.5 1'.111., that tlwy knew 1\
crewman from their ship was ahoard the
Vigilnnt. Mr. Obolensky mentioncd this
to Lieutenant Morehouse who was also
in Commander Eustis' cabin. Morehouse
left the cabin, located Eustis, and told
him the Soviets knew the defector was
on board the Vigilant. They discussed
several courses of action relative to
keeping Kudirka secure and out of sight.
Eustis was reluctant to go below to his
eabin as he anticipated possible Soviet
demands for the defector's return. The
Soviets, however, made no effort to
approach Eustis for this purpOl~e.
Lieuten:ml Ryan telephoned Caplain
Brown's residence at 5:47 p.m. in order
to inform him of the earlier eOllv('rsation at 5:] 5 p.m. between Rear Admiral
Ellis and Commander Eustis. Brown had
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not as yet arrived home, but upon his
arrival at about 6 p.m. he immediately
called Ryan. Brown was told of the
conversation between Ellis and Eustis
and the instructions issued by Ellis.
Ryan also told Brown of the Vigilant's
request for the small craft from Woods
Hole. Brown commentcd to Ryan that
the preferred course of action might be
to keep the defector in the Vigilant and
take him to New Bedford. He thcn
directed Ryan to notify Flag Plot at
Coast Guard Heudqllarters that the
defector was abourd the Vigilant. They
decided, however, that they should first
contact the Vigilant to ascertain if the
defector was still on board. At 6: II
p.m. Ryan reached the Vigilant by
means of a telephone patch. Eustis left
the watchstander's head, where he was
talking to Kudirka, to take the call. He
told Ryan the defector was still on
board, that Kudirka was in fear of his
life, and that Kudirka had indicated that
regardless of what the Coast Guard did,
he would go over the side and hope for
the best. Eustis requested a telephone
patch be made with Brown.
Th~ telephone patch with Brown was
completed at about 6: 15 p.m. Eustis
told Brown that the defector and four
other Soviets were uboard the Vigilant,
that the ddector was sincere in his
intent to defect, and of the defector's
comments regarding going over the side.
He also told Brown that the Soviets
knew the defector was on board the
Vigilant, but that he thought the Soviets
on board the Vigilant would leave if so
requested. Brown, at this time, stated,
"This is a situation which is going to
have to be resolved by the State
Department.,,22 He instructed Eustis to
request the Soviets to return to their
ship. This conversation coneluded with
u COJlnllent by Brown that he was /!oing
to call Bear Admiral Ellis. Brown
im.tructcd Lieutenant Byun to wait
before calling Flag Plot at Coast Guard
Headquarters. The time was 6::m p.m.
Captain Brown called Rear Admiral

Ellis immediately after the foregoing
conversation was terminated, apologized
for interrupting his dinner, told him he
had just talked with Commander Eustis
and whut the laller hud said. Brown also
told Ellis that he had instructed Eustis
to keep the defector in seclusion and to
ask the Soviets on board the Vigilant to
leave in order to give the First District
time to contact the Commandant of the
Coast Guard for further advicc. He
informed Ellis that the only advice he
had received from the Commandant lip
to that time coneernl~d whut to do in
the event the defector jumped in the
water. He did not tell Ellis that the
Commandant wanted to be kept advised
of developments in the case. Ellis told
Brown that the Vigilant should not
return the man without a request from
the Soviets, but if they did make such a
request the defector should be returned
to them. 23
Captain Brown made a telephone
patch with the Vigilant at 6:45 p.m. and
talked with Lieutenant Commander
Pakos initially and later Commundcr
Eustis. Pakos told him thut Ellstis was in
the process of asking the Soviets to
return to their ship. Brown wanted to
know whether the Soviets had been
asked if they desired the dl'fl~etor's
rt:lllrn. lie told Pakm; that if tlw Sovil'ls
had requested the defector's return, the
man was to be returned to the Soviet
vessel. Pakos told him that he would
'pass these instructions to Eustis and
would call him right back. The time was
6:47 p.m. As Brown waited for the
return call, he telephoned Rear Admiral
Ellis at 6:48 p.m. and reported Commander Eustis' earlier statement regarding the possibility that the defector
would go over the side of the Soviet
ship if he was retiJrned. The decision to
return the ddector, if so n'qul~sll'd hy
the Sovil'ls, WIIS not ulll'rI'd hy this hil
of information. At 6:5·t. p,m, Ellslis
talked to Brown, aeknowh~dl!l'd that
Pakos had passed the instructions to
him, stated that the Soviets had not
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made a formal request for the defector's
return, and expressed the opinion that if
the defector was returned to the Soviets
his life would probably be in jeopardy.
At that point Brown directed Eustis to
get a positive answer from the master of
the Soviet vessel as to whether he
wanted the defector returned to the
Soviet ship. Brown again stated that if
the Soviets wanted the defector back he
would be returned to the Soviet vessel.
At this point Eustis indicated that Mr.
Gordon, the representative of the
National Marine Fisheries Service, Department of Commerce, was standing by
to offer his informed opinion on the
matter, but Brown stated the fisheries
agent had no responsibility in the case
of the defector. Eustis stated that he
anticipated the Soviets would make a
request for the defeetor's return and
again commented that Kudirka said he
would make an attempt to jump into
the water once he was back aboard the
Soviet ship.
Commander Eustis was ordered by
Captain Brown to take all necessary
precautions to prevent an incident from
occurring, particularly during the tran&fer of the defector from the Vigilant to
the Sovietskaya Litva. Brown emphasi7.ed during this conversation that there
must be a formal rcquest from the:
Soviet master of the defector's ship
before the defector could be returned.
The conversation was terminated at
7:28 p.m.
At 7:30 p.m. Captain Brown telephoned Rear Admiral Ellis and informed him of Commander Eustis'
concern for Kudirka's safety and his
opinion that Kudirka's life would be in
jeopardy if he was returned to the
Soviets. To this Ellis responded" "I
don't think we have any reason' to
believe that thh; would happen. l'hey
are not haruarians. ,,24 Ellis ('onclud('el
tlHlt the information r('gardin~ Eustis'
('on('('rn for Kudirka 's wcll.uein~ did not
change the situation so as to affect his
earlier decision to return Kudirka to the

Soviets. This telephone call concluded
Ellis' involvement in the case for 2'3
November 1970. He neither received
nor made any additional calls concerning the matter that date.
At 8 p.m. the Soviets presented a
written document which requested
Kudirka's return. The document was
addressed to the Leader of the United
States Delegation as well as the Captain
of the Vigilant and was signed by the
Captain of the Sovietskaya Litva,
Vladimir M. Popov. The text of the
request follows:
During our meeting on November
23, 1970, the radio operator
KUDlRKA penetrated into my
stateroom, forced the safe, took
money from the safe in the
amount of 3,000 rubles jumped
over the fender and hid on your
vessel. Request you conduct a
search and rcturn him to my
vessel. I lodge a maritime protest
on this matter. 25
Commander Eustis considered the above
wriUcn request to satisfy Captain
Brown's requirement of a "formal
request. "
tu 8:04 p.m. Mr. Gordon placed a
te\(:l'hone patch to SOIlWOIIC he klll:W ill
thc State Departmcnt but could not
locate him. Mr. Obolcnsky and Mr.
Gordon suggestcd that Commander
Eustis carry Kudirka back to the U.S.
mainland and require the Soviets to seck
his return to them through diplomatic
channels. Lieutcnant Morehouse advised
Eustis that thc State Department should
be contacted.
Commander Eustis called Captain
Brown at 8: 19 p.111., via telephone
patch, informed him that he' had the
wriUen request f9r Kudirka's return,
that he intended 1<> return the de·fC'C'lor
to tlw Soviet vessel, Jhat tlw VigilaILt
would escort the s.ovj~J. vessel from the: '
territorial waters 6C:~lre United States,
that should the defc~ior jump into the
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water after having been returned to the
Sovietskaya Litva the Vigilant would
stand e1ear and make no attempt to
rescue him unless his safety or life was
in jeopardy. Such plan of action was
consistent with the instructions of Rear
Admiral Ellis as given in the 5: 15 p.m.
conversation and with those in Captain
Brown's conversation at 6:45 p.m.
Brown told Eustis to proceed in
accordance with his total message.
Commander. Eustis informed the
Soviets that Kudirka would be returned
to the Soviet ship. He then went to visit
Kudirka and asked him to voluntarily
return to the Soviet ship. After some
conversation, Eustis thought he had
convinced Kudirka to voluntarily return
because Kudirka wenl with him from
the watchstander's head to the commanding officer's cabin. Upon arrival at
such cabin, Kudirka saw Fleet Commander Burkal, stopped, cried "no, no,"
turned, and ran away from the eabin. 26
Eustis followed him, conversed with
him again, but was unable to persuade
him to return to the Soviet ship.
Finally, at about 9 p.m., Eustis told the
Soviet officials still on board the
V;gilant they could take Kudirka back
with them. At that time the Soviet
officers went to talk with Kudirka.
Fleet Commander Burkal spoke with
him. The conversation was heated, and
Kudirka vehemently insisted that he
would not return t6 the Soviet ship
under any circumstances. At 9:30 p.m.
the Soviets had also been unable to
persuade Kudirka to voluntarily return
to the Soviet ship. They were reluctant,
however, to use force. They requested
Eustis to use his crewmen to return the
defector to the Sovietskaya Litva.
Eustis' refusal of such request resulted
in a Soviet request that a telephone call
be placed for them to the Sovid
Embm:sy in Wm:hington. Eustis :lsk(,11 his
radioman wlll'tlwr su('h :t cnll coulc! be
madc. Thinking he desired the line, the
radioman placed the call lit 9:45 p.m.
The telephone patch between the

V;gilant and the Soviet Embassy remained open for approximately 5
minutes, but no communication was
passed. Eustis later indicated that he did
not want the Soviets calling their
Embassy from his ship until the Coast
Guard and the State Department had
been notified of their desire to do so.
Back in Boston, immediately after
the 8: 19 p.m. t~lephone conversation
between Captain Brown and Commander Eustis, Lieutenant Ryan, who
had been listening to that conversation,
suggested to Brown that Coast GUllrd
Headquarters be contacted concerning
the case. Brown concurred. At 8:24
p.m. Ryan called Flag Plot at Coast
Guard Headquarters and talked with
Lieutenant Tritbough. He reported that
the defector had gotten aboard the
Vigilant and had asked to remain bu t
was being returned at the request of the
Soviet master and that the defector was
being returned in the custody of Soviet
officials. Ryan also indicated that the
defector did not desire to go back to the
Soviet ship, and it was anticipated that
he would jump overboard therdrom if
hI: had the chanee. lIe informed
Tritbough that the V;gilant was alerted
to this possibility.
Lieutenant Tritbough had been
briefed on this maLLeI' earlil:r in thl: day
and had expected the telephone call
from Ryan. He logged the telephone call
in the Flag Plot Log at 8: 30 p.m. Hc
had taken notes of what hc considered
to be the important points of the
conversation in order to telephonically
brief Rellr Admiral Hammond, the Chief
of Staff, the Assistant Commandant,
and the Commandant of the COllst
Guard. All the foregoing telephone eulls
were made within 15 minutes after the
telephone call was received from "Bos.
Lon. A CLer reeeiving the 1::111 from
'I'rit h()u~h, 111111111101111 I!Ondtlll.·c! t hnt
the informlltion 'I'rith()u~h WIIH IlItll.~ing
meant Lhut the return of till: c!dedor
was in the process of taking plat:I:, or
had already taken place by that time,
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and the case was closed. I n fact,
however, the return of the defector did
not take place until more than 3 hours
later, as will be subsequently reportcd in
this article. Hammond also concludcd
that the defector had voluntarily returned to the Soviet ship. This conclusion was also erroncous.
Lieutenant Tritbough tclephoned the
State Departmcnt Operations Center at
8:45 p.m. and talked with Mr. Kevin J.
McGuire, the assistant watch officer.
Neither the senior nor the assistant
watch officer at the Operations Center
had received any specific instructions
concerning this case, but a copy of the
Vigilnnt's 12:43 p.m. message was
posted on the Operations Center reading
board. Although there were tape recorders present in both the Flag Plot
duty offiee and the State Department
Operations Center, neither of these
machines were functioning. There is no
transcript or recording of the conversation between Tritbough and McGuire.
This is unfortunate because the evidence
is in dispute as to what was said
concerning certain matters. Lieutenant
Tritbough claims to have used his notes
to rclate the substance of the message
he had received from Lieutenant Ryan
in Roston to McGuire. He states that he
said the defector "is being returned"
and that the Vigilant would escort the
Soviet ship to international waters. He
further states that he used no words
which, in his opinion, suggested that the
matter had been finally resolved. 2 7
Tritbough requested that his report be
passed to the Soviet Desk within the
State Department. McGuire, on the
other hand, states that Tritbough told
him the case had been resolved. As
earlier noted, Lieutenant Tritbough
denies using any words which suggested
the matter had been finally resolved.
Mr. McGuire also claims that he read a
summary of their conversation to
Lieutenant Tritbough and the latter
approved it before the conversation
ended. Lieutenant Tritbough does not

re(:all any.sueh reading or giving his
approval of any such summary.28
Mr. McGuire, at the suggestion of the
senior watch officer, notified the
European Area duty officer that evening
and Mr. Mainland, the Soviet Desk duty
officer. Mainland telephoned Flag Plot
at Coast Guard Headquarters, awakened
Licutenant Tritbough at 11:30 p.m.,
and asked if there were any new
devclopments in the case. Tritbough
informed Mainland that he had received
no new information since his last report
to the State Department, but a situation
report was expected the next morning.
As the foregoing activity was taking
place in Washington, the problems in
the Vigilnnt had not subsided. Commander Eustis and Lieutenant Commander Pakos discussed the situation,
and Pakos had drafted a message which
he proposed be sent to the First District
and an information copy be sent to the
Commandant of the Coast Guard. The
message recommended that the Vigilant
depart the Soviet vessel with the
defector on board and that the State
Department decide what to do with him
as an alternative to the instructions
issued to the Vigilnnt thus far in the
case. Eustis decided not to use the
m(~s."ap;e ll(~eausc he considered that
sending an information copy to the
Commandant would not be following
the chain of command. He assumed that
Coast Guard Headquarters had been
kept properly informed. Instead of
sending the message, its important
points were summarized as a note for
Eustis to refer to in a telephone
conversation with Captain Brown. The
three important points of the note were
that the Soviets were reluctant to use
their own men to forcibly return the
defector to the Soviet ship, that the
Soviets desired to consult with their
Embas."y ill \V a~hingtoll, and llHlt Em;lis
recommendcd an altcrnate solution of
the problem by retaining Kudirka on
board the Vigilant and requiring the
Soviets to request his return through
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diplomatic channels. Eustis called
Brown at 10:14 p.m. and advised him
that the situation aboard the Vigilant was
tense, and that force would be necessary
to return the defector to the Soviet
ship. Eustis does not recall whether he
communicated all three of the above
enumerated points to Brown because
during the conversation Brown said,
"Y ou have your orders. You have no
discretion. Use whatever force is necessary. Do not let an inciden t occur. ,,29
Brown's attitude was formal and firm at
the time. Eustis concluded that he had
received a direct order and that he must
comply therewith.
The Return. After his last conversation with Captain Brown, Commander
Eustis returned to his cabin and
reluctantly told the Soviets, "He's all
yours. ,,30 The Soviets told Eustis they
wanted to use six men to return
Kudirka. Eustis suggested that the
Soviets then present take Kudirka
themselves, but they declined to do so.
He then realized that they considered
that it would not be proper for them as
officers to struggle with one of their
crew. For that reason, Eustis decided
that they would be permitted to bring
three crewmen aboard the Vigilant in
order to return Kudirka to the Soviet
ship. Eustis has later stated that he
decided to permit the Soviets to come
aboard the Vigilant to remove Kudirka
for three reasons: He felt that adverse
publicity could result from the use of
Coast Guardsmen to forcibly return a
defector to the Soviets; if the defector
went overboard and was lost while
Coast Guardsmen were attempting to
return him, they might be accused of
letting him escape; and, he was concerned with the possible effect personnel participation in the forcible
return of the dl~(I'et(lr would havl~ on
the morale of his own erew.
Five Soviet crewmen were transferred to the Vigilant by means of the
personnel net instead of three as

authorized by Eustis. These Soviet
crewmen brought a hlanket, rope, and a
ball of material which appeared to he
socks. A Soviet crewman indicated the
ball of material was to be placed in the
defector's mouth. One of the Soviet
crewmen was the second mate with
whom Ensign Hughes had been able to
converse earlier in the day. At about
10:45 p.m. Eustis escorted thc Soviets
to Kudirka where he again talked with
Kudirka and the Soviet FII:et Commander. Kudirka persisted in his refu~1
to return to the Soviet ship. He m;krd
for a knife for the stated purpose of
killing himself. The request was, of
course, denied. Kudirka told Eustis he
would fight anyone who tried to take
him off the Vigilant. At this point,
Eustis turned Kudirka over to the
Soviets. Before starting to move to a
lower deck of the ship with the Soviets,
Kudirka removed his shirt, emptied his
pockets, and gave all his personal
possessions, including some notes,
books, and papers, to Eustis. It is noted
that none of the ruhles which the
Soviets alleged Kudirka had stolen were
in his possession at this time.
The Soviet party started down to the
lower decks with Kudirka. As they
neamd tlw cllptain's eahin, wlwre Ihe
civilians in the U.S. delegation were
located, Kudirka broke away and
attempted to enter the cabin. He
managed to open the cabin door before
he was grabbed by the Soviets who tried
to break the grip he had on the cabin
doorknob. As this occurred, Mr. Brieze
attempted to push the Soviets away
from Kudirka, but Mr. Gordon informed him that there had been orders
to return Kudirka and that they must
not interfere. The Soviets then took
Kudirka to the port boat deck. The time
was ahout 10:50 p.m. Eustis returned to
hi:; c:lhin a8 mooring Rlnliom; w(~rl'
piped, and the word was passed 10
prepare to get underway. Upon arrival
011 the port boat deck, Kudirka broke
loose from the Soviet party but was
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partially restrained by the Soviets
underneath the port motor lifeboat
where the struggle continued. Kudirka
then broke loose, went over the side of
the port boat deck, and personnel in the
Vigilant thought he went overboard into
the water betwcen the two ships.
Actually, however, he had swung down
to the main deck. "Man overboard" was
sounded throughout the Vigilant. While
this action was taking place, a large
number of Soviet crewmen had gathered
at the rail of the Soviet ship. As they
followcd the strugglc between the
Soviets and Kudirka a few feet away on
board the Vigilant, they screamed,
yelled, and pointed, creating a substantial commotion. These crewmen on the
Sovietskaya Litva had seen that Kudirka
had not gone overboard, and they tried
to point him out to his Soviet pursuers.
The time was about ll:OO p.m. The
ships were moored about 3 feet apart.
Thinking that the defector might be
crushcd between the ships and rccognizing the potential for troublc in this
tense situation, EUl'tis gave the order to
unmoor the Vigilant and to get
underway immediately. Inasmuch as the
mooring lines were bclayed or turncd
around c1eatl' aboard thc Soviet vessel,
all but two Iincs wer!! lI:t go by their
bitter or inboard ends. The two other
lines were cut with axes. During the
unmooring, Eustis was on the bridge
and had control of the ship. In backing
straight down and standing clear of the
Soviet vessel, the yard boom net rigged
from the Soviet ship knocked down the
Vigilant's antennas, carried away the
forward port life lines and a port
running light, and damaged three or
four stanchions.
As noted above, Kudirka did not go
overboard as many thought when he
broke away from the Soviets and went
over the side of the port boat deck. He
swung from the port boat deck to the
main deck and ran aft on the port side
onto the fantail of the Vigilant. Once on
the fantail, he ran about as if he did not

know what to do or wherc to go. Two
pursuing Sovicts arrived on the fantail.
When Kudirka saw them he attempted
to climb over the starboard taffrail but
was grabbed by two Coast Guardsmen
who acted spontaneously in order to
prevent a person from going overboard.
Within seconds the two pursuing Sovicts
took custody of Kudirka after having
taken him away from the two men who
prevented him from going overboard.
Two more Soviets arrived and joined in
the struggle to subdue Kudirka. As they
dragged him toward the ladder leading
up to the flight deck, Kudirka was
trying very hard to escape from their
grasps. He was earried up the ladder to
the flight deck. In the process of doing
so, one Soviet repeatedly struck Kudirka's head against the steel handrail of
the ladder. Coast Guard crewmen on the
fantail saw no blood or other visible
signs of injury on Kudirka. The
commotion on the fantail was not
reported to the bridge by the crewman
manning the mooring station soundpowered telephone. .
Earlier when "Man overboard" was
sounded, Ensign Hughes went to the
port side of the flight deck to look for
the man in the water. Subsequently he
saw Kudirka heing hrought up till:
ladder from the fantail to the flight
deck by the four Soviets. As the Soviets
took Kudirka to the forward end of the
flight deck, Hughes was able to stop one
of the Soviets from beating Kudirka by
talking to the Soviet second mate who
understood some English and with
whom he had talked earlier in the day.
The second mate passed directions from
Hughes to the rest of the Soviets
attempting to control Kudirka. Hughes
reported to the bridge that the Soviets
were having difficulty restraining Kudirka. He retumed to the flight deck,
mill upon his arrival he stoppl~(1 the
Soviets from beating Kudirka and tying
him to a winch. The Soviets had tied a
line around Kudirka's neck. Hughes
returned to the bridge and reeorted that
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the Soviets appeared to be trying to
seriously injure Kudirka. Lieutenant
Commander Pakos directed him to
prevent the Soviets from hurting the
defector.
Hughes returned and moved the
Soviets and Kudirka further forward on
the flight deck. He received instructions
from Pakos to take them to the mess
deck. When the Soviets refused to go to
the mess deck, Pakos ordered Hughes to
take them to the helicopter shack on
the forward end of the flight deck. The
Soviets took Kudirka inside the heli·
coptcr shack as directed. Hughes stationed two Coast Guard gunners mates
outside the area where the Soviets and
Kudirka were located. Hughes departed
briefly, and upon his return the Soviets
were again roughing up Kudirka. Hughes
was again able to stop the Soviets by
talking to the second mate. As indicated, Hughes was able to stop the
Soviet brutality several times, but
whenever he was momentarily away
from the Soviets they resumed mistreating Kudirka. 31
Orders for the Vigilant's crew to lay
below werc passed via the ship's public
addrcss system. Hughes and the two
gunners mates had kept the ship's crew
off the flight deck, directing them not
to get involved.
While Kudirka was in the helicopter
shack, the Soviets wrapped him in the
blanket and tied him up with the line
they had brought with them from the
Soviet ship. The Soviets attempted to
put the blanket over his head, but he
successfully resisted their efforts to do
so. Kudirka had fought vigorously until
he was completely bound, except for his
head, in the blanket. Finally, at 11:15
p.m. the Soviets had Kudirka under
control.
Commander Eustis tlwn went to thc
boat deck whem Kudirka had tll'cn
taken, observed him bound in the
blanket, and expressed to Kudirka his
sympathy and personal concern. AI-

though Kudirka said nothing, Eustis
thought he had been undcrstood. ~~lIstis
has stated that he saw no indication that
Kudirka had received physical injury at
that time. 3 2 Eustis decided to use one
of his small boats to return all the
Soviets and Kudirka to the Soviet.~kaya
Litva. He instructed Lieutenant Commander Pakos to eon tact Captain Brown
in order to get his permission to' do so.
Pakos reached Brown at 11:30 p.m.,
in formed him of the situation, lmd
requested permission to IItilh~e tllll
Vigilant's boat to return all the S()vi(~ts
and Kudirka to the Soviet ship. After
receiving assurance that the weather and
sca were satisfactory, Brown authorized
the usc of thc Vigilant's boat.
Ensign Hughes was in charge of the
unarmed boat detail. At 11:40 p.m. two
or three Soviets threw Kudirka, still
bound in the blanket, a distance of 2 or
3 feet into the boat. He was face down
in the bottom of the boat with one
Soviet sitting on his head. The Vigilant's
boat crew did not know whether
Kudirka was conscious at this time.
After all hands were in the bout. it was
lowered into tIll! water at II :41 p.lII.
One Soviet struck Kudirka <luring the
trip between the two ships. WI\('n tllll
boat reudled the Sovid ship, a Iwt was
lowered and the Soviets threw Kudirka
into the net which was raised to the
deck of the Sovietskaya Litva. From
that time on it was not possible for the
Vigilant's boat crew to observe what, if
anything, was happening to Kudirka.
Aftl!r the rl'st of the Soviets hoardl'd
their ship, the small boat en'w retrit:ved
the lines that were carried away by the
Soviet ship when the Vigilant got
underway. They also recovered the
Vigilant's broken whip anlimna. The
slIIall hoat saft·ly ret II rlll'd 10 1111'
Vi~i1alll al II :;,;, p.m. Thl' l'i~i1111l1
l'sl'orlell 1111' Sovid Vl'ssl'l 10 inll'rlllllional waters. A t 1:05 a.lII. on :.H
November 1970, the Vigilant smll a
message to the First Const G lIarcl
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District reporting the transfer of Kudirka hud bcen accomplishcd at ] 1:55
p.m. Sometime after Kudirka was
returncd to the Soviet vessel, Commander Eustis indicated to the civilians
aboard the Vigilant that he felt badly
about what had happened and hoped
the incident would soon be forgotten.
TIJI: Vigilant returned to New Bedford
at 3:30 a.m. on 24 November 1970.33

Recommendution ]. That CAPT
BROWN be awarded a General
Court-Martial for trial on charges
of Dereliction of Duty for his
failure to inform the Commandant of the progress of the case
and for his failure to retain the
defector aboard the Vigilant until
having advice from proper authority•••.

Official and Public Reaction. Television news programs reported the
President of the United States wus
outraged when he learned of Kudirka's
return to the Soviels. Secretary of State
William P. Rogers was reported to have
said, according to a United Press
International report, that it was unbelievable to him that the commander
of a Coast Guard vessel permilled Soviet
crewmen of a fishing boat to board his
ship and forcibly take off a Lithuanian
defector. 34 Demonstrations to protest
the denial of political asylum to
Kudirka occurred in New York, Boston,
Philadelphia, Cleveland, and Chieago. 3 5
A subcommillec of the Foreign Affuirs
Committee of the House of Representatives initiated a congressional investigation of the eaSl: and made periodic
rel('us($ 10 the m:ws llI!'dia of IWWS
concerning its proeeedings. 3 6 Both the
Coast Guard and tlw State Department
also initiated investigations of their
own.
After reeeiving and reviewing the
report of the Board of Investigation in
the ease, the Commandant of the Coast
Guard approved the recommendation of
the board concerning establishing beller
liaison with the State Department and
initiation of a review of the communications difficulties experienced by the
Vigilant and the First Coast Guard
Distriet to d!'termine what ehanlrl's, if
,IllY, IIIay 11(: lJ('el's~ul)'. Wilh n'/?;:trll 10
the !,l'r:'onn!'1 USpl~l'ts of till' !'USI', IIII'
Comlllundant reviewI:d till: n'('on"III'ndutions of till' IlOurd und took udion us
indicated below:

Recommendation No. 1 is concurred in. In spite of the fact that
CAPT BROWN should have excrcised independently his authority
as Acting District Commander, I
am convinced that he was markedly influenced in his course of
action by the forceful advice he
had received from RADM ELLIS.
There is liLllc doubt that regardless of the results of a trial CAPT
BROWN's performance during
this entire incident has seriously
impaired his effectiveness as a
senior captain on active duty. For
these reasons, if CAPT BROWN
immediately submits a request for
retirement, I shall aece!'t it and
not refer the charge for trial, but
rather wiII issue a Punitive Letter
o[ Reprimand under Artieh: J!i of
the Uniform Code of Military
Justice.
Reeommendation 2. That RADM
ELLIS be issued a Punitive Letter
of Reprimand from the Commandant for offering instruction or
advice without having informed
himself of the facts and policy
necessary for a proper decision, all
to the prejudice of good order and
discipline in the service; that he be
removed from command and
m;kecl to retire as soon as his
IlI'ulth I)('r",il~ hUI nol lull'r Ih:",
:31 J:lIIl1ary 1971; und thut in the
intl:rim he be a~signed to a
p()~iti()n
of minilllal responsibilities.
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Recommendation No. 2 is not
concurred in. It is true that
RAOM'" ELLIS disobeyed no
orders; he was not, in fact, in the
chain of command at the time of
the incident. Nevertheless, he gave
advice having the force of orders
and adhered to his position firmly
and even stubbornly in spite of
the fact that he was informed that
principal staff officers were not in
agreement with his position and in
spite of the fact that he knew that
advice had been sought from the
Commandant. His actions prompting the recommendation for a
Punitive Letter of Reprimand
were such as to make him no lcss
responsible in the matter than
CAPT BROWN. Accordingly, I
direct the Board to embody the
misconduct it found to exist in an
appropriate charge or charges and
specifications. I find such charges
should be referred for trial by
court-martial. In this instance
however, as in the instance of
CAPT BROWN, there is little
doubt that regardless of the
results of a trial, RAOM ELLIS'
performance during the incident
has seriously impaired his effectiveness as a flag officer on active
duty. For this reason, if RAOM
ELLIS immediately submits a
request for retirement, I shall
accept it and not refer the charge
or charges for trial, but rather will
issue a Punitive Letter of Reprimand under Article 15 of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice.
Recommendation 3. That CDR
EUSTIS be issued an Administrative Letter of Reprimand from
the Commandant for allowing
Soviet crewmcmbl'rs IIbo:\rd his
vessel to removc a Soviet defcctor
without exercising upon thl' (sic)
proper restraints; and that he be

immediately reassigned from the
Vigilant.
Recommendation 3 is concurred
in to the extent that CDR
EUSTIS be issued an Administrative Letter of Reprimand (nonpunitive). I do not concur in the
stated reason for the issuance of
this letter. I recognize that CDR
EUSTIS found himself in a
difficult and trying situation. He
had been told to use whatever
force was neecssary to return the
defector to his vessel. It is
apparent that he had become
emotionally affected by the unhappy predicament in which the
defector had been placed. While I
can sympathize with his position,
I cannot conc(~ive of any commanding
officcr
interpreting
orders authorizing the use of
necessary force so as to permit
foreign nationals to exercise authority on board a Coast Guard
vessel, whether or not proper
restraints were imposed. CDR
EUSTIS erred in allowing the
Soviet vessel's crewmen to exercise any control of the defector
while on board the Vigilant. His
error in judgment reflects an
inadequate understanding of the
underlying principle of the sovereignty of a United States naval
vessel. Although his reprimand is
not to be punitive, I concur that
he can no longer serve effectively
as Commanding Officer of the
Vigilant and must he transferred
to other duty.37
The Commandant of the Coast Guard
also noted in his action on the
investigation of this case:
Although nol mentioned III the
opinions or recommendations,
hindsight indicates that more
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aggressive actions on the part of
Coast Guard Headquarters might
have altered the prosecution of
this inciden t. Specifically, Coast
Guard Headquarters might well
have insisted on more definite
guidance from State Department. 38
The Secretary of Transportation,
John A. Volpe, reviewed this matter and
stated:
I do not concur in the award of
court-martial in the case of Rear
Admiral William B. Ellis, USCG,
and Captain Fletcher W. Brown,
Jr., USCG. It is my considered
view that no purpose would be
served by subjecting either RADM
Ellis or Captain Brown to a
court-martial. There is no doubt
that both of these officers now
appreciate fully their serious error
of judgment in this case. It is also
clear that they have been subjected to most extreme castigation
from many quarters in this nation.
This, indeed, is a severe indictment for which both they and
their families have already suffered.
For these reasons, you are directed to withdraw court-martial
charges of any sort against RADM
Ellis and Captain Brown. However, I do fully concur in the
issuance of Punitive Letters of
Reprimand to both officers. In
taking this action, I have taken
note of the fact that both officers
are submitting requests for immediate retirement and that these
requests will be accepted.
I approve of your action in the
case of Commander Halph W.
Eustis, USCG. 39
Some Precedent, Current Policy, and
Law Regarding Asylum. On 5 June

1894 the Cqmmanding Officer of the
U.S.S. Bennington permitted 17 persons
who sought asylum as political refugees
to board his ship while lying in the port
of La Libertad in EI Salvador. When the
Commanding Officer was initially requested to grant the refugees asylum, he
refused to do so. He later granted them
asylum after he was assured that they
would be summarily shot if they were
caught by the forces of the revolution
which had just seized control and
proclaimed a provisional government of
EI Salvador. It was his expectation that
the asylum on board the Bennington
would last only a few days until the
refugees could be transferred to a
steamer bound for Panama. On the day
the steamer arrived in port, however,
the consul of the United States at EI
Salvador and two commissioners from
the provisional government boarded the
Bennington, and thc latter requestcd the
surrender of the refugees as common
criminals. The Commanding Officer of
the Bennington refused to surrender the
refugees without orders from the
Seert'tary of the Navy. Th(' conllni~
si()ll('r~ thcll appealed to him not to
transfer the refugees to the steamer but
to hold them until extradition could be
demanded of the United States through
proper chmlllds. The COlllnHullling
Officer acceded to this request, subj('ct
to fu ture instructions of the Secretary
of the Navy. The conduct of the
Commanding Officer of the Bennington
on this occasion was characterized as
eminently judicious and proper. 40
President Cleveland is quoted, with
reference to the Salvadorean refugees
case, as stating:
The Government of Salvador
having been over thrown by an
abrupt popular outbreak, certain
of its military and civil offj\'er~,
while hotly pursued by infuriated
insurgents, sought refuge 011 hoard
the United States war ship Benni1lgton, then lying in a Salva-
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dorean port. Although the practice of asylum is not favored by
this Government, yet in view of
the imminent peril which threatened the fugitives, and solely from
considerations of humanity, they
were afforded shelter by our naval
commander, and when afterwards
demanded under our treaty of
extradition with Salvador for trial
on charges of murder, arson, and
robbery, I directed that such of
them as had not voluntarily left
the ship be conveyed to one of
our nearest ports where a hearing
could be had before a judicial
officer in compliance with the
terms of the treaty. On their
arrival at San Francisco such a
procceding was promptly institutcd before the United States
district judge, who held that the
acts constituting the alleged offenses were political, and discharged all the accused except one
Cienfuegos, who was held for an
attempt to murder. Thereupon I
was constrained to direct his
release, for the reason that an
attempt to murder was not one of
the crimes charged against him
and upon which his surrender to
the Salvadorean authorities had
been demanded. 4 1
One of the results of the Salvadorean
refugees case was that the Secretary of
the Navy issued a regulation substantially as it appears today in Navy
Regulations: 42

0621. Granting of Asylum.
The right of asylum for politicalor other refugees has no
foundation in international law.
In countries, however, where
frequen t insurrrl:t ions occur, and
constant instability of government
exists, usage sanctions the granting of asylum; but even in waters
of such countries, officers should

refuse all applications for asylum
except when required by the
interests of humanity in extreme
or exceptional cases, such as the
pursuit of a refugee by a mob.
Officers shall neither directly nor
iTlllirect!(; invite refugees to accept
asylum. 3
On 23 November 1970, thc date of the
attempted defection by Kudirka, there
was no similar Coast Guard regulation in
fore!! concerning asylum.
Suhsequent to the issual1l:e of the
foregoing Navy Regulation before the
turn of this century, other obligations
to grant asylum have been assumed by
tlll~ United States. The plaque inside: the
pcdestal of the Statue of Liberty
reflects U.S. policy and includes the
following:
Giv~ me your tired, your poor,

Your huddled masses yearning
to breathe free,
The wretched refuse of your
teeming shores,
Send these, the homeless,
tempest-tossed to me:
[ lift my lamp beside the
golden door!44
On II J)(:ecmher 1%2 Mn;. Franklin 1>.
Roosevelt, U.S. delegate to the Seventh
Regular Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, stated
that the United States " ••• would never
force a refugee to return to his country
of origin against his will.,>4 5 The U.S.
Representative to the United Nations,
Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, made the
following statement on 20 April 1961 in
the Political and Security Committee of
the General Assembly of the United
Nations:
So long as AJI\('riCalUl n'lIlain a
frce people, just so long will they
uphold the right of asylum as a
fundamental human right. This
will not change. Nor, 1 profoundly
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believe, will the pressure to be
frce stop. I do not deny that since
the war thc arca of tyranny has
widcned in somc parts of the
world. In thesc areas people
cannot protest their position publicly or make clear their profound
desire for Iiberty_ But it remains a
fact that thousands upon thousands have registered their protest
in the only way o~en to them.
Thcy have cseaped.4
Article 14 of thc Univcrslll ))cclllration
of Human Rights, adopted by the
General Assembly of the United Nations
at its Third Session, staLes that every
person has a right to seek and to enjoy
in other countries asylum from persecution. 47 A statement on U.S. refugee
policy was made by Mr. Robert
McCloskey, Department of State press
spokesman, on 1 December 1970, as
follows:
There has been no change in
American policy regarding thc
admission of rcfugccs into tlw
United States. Sincc the cnd of
World War II well ovcr one million
refugees from countries around
the world have, within the scope
of our laws, been admittcd to thc
United States for permanent residence. That, in our judgment, is
an impressive record. And I just
wanted to make it clear that thcre
has been no change in that
poliey.48
In addition to the above indications
of an open arms policy for political
asylum seekers, the United States is a
signatory to the Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees to which the
Senate advised and consented on 4
October 19GB, the Presidcnt approv('d
on 15 October 196B, lIIul which h(~canw
effective on I Novcmber 196B.49
Article 33 of thc Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees, which is

applicable to the United States through
the Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees, provides in paragraph I as
follows:
Prohibition of Expulsion or Return

1. No Contracting State shall
expel or return ("refouler") a
refugee in any manner whatsoever
to the frontiers of territories
wherc his life or freedom would
be thrcatencd on account of his
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion.
Article lA (2) of the Convention, as
modified by article 1, paragraph 2 of the
Protocol, defines a refugee as a
person who ..• owing to well
founded fear of being persecuted
for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political
opinion, is outside .the country of
his nationality and is unablc or,
owing to such fcar, is unwilling Lo
avail himself of the protection of
that country.
Finally, article IF of the Convention
tIt<: provisions of thc Convention
shall not apply to any pcrson with
rcspeet Lo whom there are serious
reasons for considering that he has
committcd a serious nonpolitical crime
outside the country of refuge prior to
admission to that country as a refugee.
The Soviets have frequently cited the
foregoing provision and at the same
time have falsely alleged that the
refugee had committed some nonpolitical crime as a stratagem to cause
the country of refuge to refuse to grant
asylum to escapees. Accordingly, any
sllch cllIim by the Soviets musl be
cxmnincd with cl1re. SUdll1ll eXlllninl1tion is a propcr function of the
Dcpartment of StaLe as is indicated in
the subsequent recommendations.
sLlIL(~s
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Resultant Effect of Incident on
Certain Persons. It has been ascertained
by the author that Rear Admiral Ellis
and Captain Brown received letters of
reprimand and retired from active
service in the Coast Guard on 31
January 1971 as contemplated by the
Commandant of the Coast Guard.
Commander Eustis received a nonpunitive reprimand and has been transferred to new duties ashore. One
Congressman is reported to have stated
with regard to Eustis, "1 don't think,
the way the system works, his future in
the Coast Guard is very rosy."5 0
Kudirka is reported in good health,
living in a new apartment in his home
city of Klaipeda, Lithuania, and as yet
has not been arrested by the Soviets for
his attempted defection. The captain of
the Sovietskaya Litva, Vladimir M.
Popov, is reported to have been
court-martialed and sent to a Sovict
labor camp apparently for failing to
prevent the attempted defection by
Kudirka. The rcported status of Kudirka
may be a surprise to many readers. The
Soviets have in the past, however, staged
news conferences to denounce the \V cst,
using defectors who have rcturned or
persons such as Kudirka whose attempt
to defect was not successful. Some such
persons have becn arrested, tried, and
punished after they have been used in
such propaganda efforts. This may be
the reason for Kudirka's reported
freedom and new apartment. His fate
may be determined after a propaganda
effort in which the Soviets now seek his
cooperation.5 1
It has also been ascertained that the
Department of State has, subsequent to
23 November 1970, issued to the Coast
Guard, and all U.S. departments and
agencies which have, prior to this
incident, not been involvcd in refugee
unt! defector affuirs, proc(!dures for
handling n~(]lwsts for ~olitieul asylulIl
from foreign nationals. s
Recommendations. The issue of
granting or dcnying political asylum

involves the application of international
and domestic laws and domestic policies
to specific facts and circumstances in
cach refugee's case. The decision to
grant or deny asylum also involves
political considerations and possibly
foreign relations with other nations.
Such matters are not normally under
the cognizance of the Coast Guard,
Navy, Army, Air Force, or the Marine
Corps but arc properly matters administered by thc Dcpartment of Statc. Thc
ultimate decision to grant or deny
political asylum to a refugcc is,
therefore, a matter for the Department
of State to handle. This is not to say,
however, that every decision concerning
a refugce secking asylum must bc made
by the State Department. Thc commander of any U.S. ship, camp, or
aircraft who is confronted by a refugee
who has presented himself on board
such ship, camp, or aircraft and who has
requested asylum, must make thc initial
decision to grant or deny temporary
asylum to the refugee. It is submitted
that the above-m('ntioned Convention
und Protocol urc implicit in requiring u
reasonuble inquiry to be nUHlc to
determinc whether the refugee or
defector is entitled to refugee status
under such Convention and Protocol.
Accordingly, a commander may grant
temporary asylum and retain the person
in U.S. custody for a sufficient time to
permit his status to be determined and
the ultimate decision to be made on the
issue of asylum.
It is recommended that a U.S.
commander who is confronll:d hy a
person who seeks politicul asylum tuke
action hy:
1. Grunting such person temporary asylum and retaining him in
U.S. custody;

2. Ascertaining as many facts and
circumstances conccrning the
possible basis for the requested
asylum and the bona fide nature
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thereof as may be expeditiously
obtained;

3. Immediately
reporting all
known and reported facts and
circumstances concerning the matter to superior authority via the
mosL expeditious means;53 and,
4. Retaining the person in U.S.
cuslody pending thc receipt of
directives from competent superior authority.
Under no circumstances should the
person seeking asylum be arbitrarily or
summarily expelled from a U.S. ship,
camp, or aircraft pending determination
of his status. To the extent circumstances permit, persons seeking asylum
should he afforded reasonable care and
protection.

I L is further recommended that
Article 0621, U.S. Navy Regulations,
1948, be revised to rcflcet currcnt
policy and procedures for granting
asylum within the Navy and the Marine
Corps.

--

Thc spherc of the Navy is
international solely. It is this
which allies it so e10sely to that of
the statesman. Aim to be. yourselves statesmen as well as seamen.
The biography and history of our
profession will give you glorious
names who have been both. I trust
the future lIlay show many such
among the sons of this College.
Alfred T. Mahan:
To Naval War College Class
of 1909
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APPENDIX I
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
Monday, 23 November 1970

8:00 a.m.
8:49 a.m..
10:30 a.m.
11:00 a.m.
12:43 p.m.
12:49 p.m.
I: ] 8 p.m.
1:20 p.m.
1:26 p.m.
1:28 p.m.
1:30 p.m.
1:38 p.m.
2:00 p.m.
2:23 p.m.
2: 30 p.m.
2:45 p.m.
3: ] 5 p.m.
3:36 p.m.
3:30 p.m.
3:45 p.m.
4: 12 p.m.
4:20 p.m.
4:30 p.m.
4:.10 p.m.
5: 15 p.m.
5:40 p.m.
5:44 p.m.
5:47 p.m.
6:00 p.m.
6: 15 p.m.
6:38 p.m.
6:38 p.m.
6:45 p.m.
6:4B p.m.
6: 5·~ p.m.
7:;W p.m.
8:00 p.m.
8:04 p.m.

U.S. delegation boards Vigilant
Vigilant' underway
Vigilant moored to Soviet ship
First overture of defection noted
Vigilant sends message to First Coast Guard District
Message received
Captain Brown calls Rear Admiral Hammond
Captain Brown calls Rear Admiral Ellis
Vigilant message doubleheaded to Coast Guard Headquarters
Vigilant message received at headquarters
First Coast Guard District sends message to Vigilant
Vigilant 12:43 message sent to State Department
Kudirka passes cigarettes and note· to Lieut('nant Lundberg
Vigilant sends message to First CQast Guard District
Conference in Captain Brown's office
Captain Dahlgren contacts Mr. Killham, State Department
Mr. Killham calls Captain Dahlgren
Vigilant receives First Coast Guard District instructions
Captain Brown calls Rear Admiral Ellis
Captain Dahlgren calls Captain Brown
Captain Brown calls Rear Admiral Hammond
Kudirka jumps aboard Vigilant
Captain Dahlgren calls Mr. Killham
Captain Brown left office for home
Commander Eustis calif: Rear Admiral Ellis
Vigilant calls Woods lIole
Woods Hole calls RCC
Lieutenant Ryan tries to call Captain Brown
Captain Brown calls Lieutenant Ryan
Commander Eustis calls Captain Brown
First Coast Guard District receives Vigilant's 2:23 message
Captain Brown calls Rear Admiral Ellis
Captain Brown calls Lieutenant Commander Pakos
Captain Brown calls Hear Admiral Ellis
CommHlII!I'r Eu::t i" I'all" Captain Brown
Captain Brown I'all" HI',lr Admiral Ellis
Formal request for return of Kudirka
~Ir. Gordon tries to call his friend in State Department
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8:19 p.m.
8:24p.m.
8:30 p.m.
8:45 p.m.
9:45 p.m.
10:14 p.m.
!0:30p.m.
11:00 p.m.
11:15 p.m.
11:30 p.m.
11:30 p.m.
11:40 p.m.
11:50 p.m.
11:55 p.m.
12:00 p.m.

Commander Eustis calls Captain Brown
Lieutenant Ryan calls Lieutenant (junior grade) Tritbough
Lieutenant (junior grade) Tritbough calls Rear Admiral Hammond
and other Coast Guard officers in Washington
Lieutenant (junior grade) Tritbough calls Mr. McGuire, State
Department
Call placed to Soviet Embassy from Vigilant
Commander Eustis calls Captain Brown
Soviet crewmen board Vigilant
Vigilant unmoors from Soviet ship
Kudirka subdued by Soviet crewmen
Mr. Mainland talks with Lieutenant (junior grade) Tritbough
Lieutenant Commander Pakos calls Captain Brown
Kudirka loaded in small boat
Kudirka returned to Soviet ship
Small boat returns to Vigilant
Vigilant escorts Soviet vessel into international waters

Tuesday, 24 November 1970

:J: 30 a.m.

Vigilant moors at New Bedford
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